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RECENT DECISIONS
ance in the principal case. It would seem that the participant should be able
to control the publicity at least until the completion of the performance when
it would become a subject for news, for example, in a newspaper in a reportorial
fashion.
The television station and network as well as the sponsor did obtain some
benefit from the telecast. If the act had not been televised the time would have
had to have been filled with some other subject. The court stressed in W/itmark
v. Bamberger, 291 F. 776 (D. N. J. 1923) that a radio station is not an eleemosy-
nary institution, but is conducted for profit, and the defendant must pay for the
use of copyrighted music, even though it broadcast its slogan only at the beginning
and at the end of the program as was done in the principal case. Television is
not different from radio in this respect. Is it not true, therefore, that the tele-
vision station used the performance for the purpose of trade? See, Herbert v.
Shanley, 242 U. S. 591, 37 S. Ct. 232 (1917). Associated Music v. Memorial Radio
Fund, 141 F. 2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944), certiorari denied 323 U. S. 766, 65 S. Ct.
120 (1944).
It may be contended that public policy supports the principal decision. If
the contrary were held, any spectator at a sporting event would have a cause of
action if televised. However, this would not necessarily be true. Only a per-
former whose act did not constitute news would have an action. The spectators
are only incidental to the reporting of the event. The performance in itself is an
entity and nor merely incidental; and plaintiff is an independent contractor, nor
an employee of the football dub that authorized the television of the game.
Certainly, no harm can be done to extend the New York Civil Rights Law, if
there need be an extension, to cover the situation in the principal case.
Ralph L. Halpern
TORTS-OVERTHROW OF THE CHARITIES' IMMUNITY DOCTRINE-
JUDICIAL COGNIZANCE OF CHANGING PUBLIC
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Plaintiff was injured when the wheel-stretcher upon which she was riding
escaped the grasp of a nurse's aide employed by the defendant, and overturned.
The complaint charged defendant charity hospital with failure to exercise due
care in the selection of its employees. At trial, a directed verdict was given to
the defendant, and plaintiff's motion for retrial denied. Plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court of Arizona held that the question of negligence should have
gone to the jury, and, upon the plaintiff's request, reviewed the doctrine of Char-
ities' Tort Immunity, and declared the policy overruled. Ray et ux. v. Tuscon
Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2nd 220 (1951).
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As a general rule, charities in the United States have been given plenary
grants of immunity against tort claims.arising out of the negligent acts of their
employees. The courts have established four main rationales for this immunity:
(1) The 'Trust-Fund" theory. The courts felt that to divert the contri-
butions away from the charity would be to frustrate the donor's intent, and to
inhibit further contributions. See further, 5 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (2nd
Ed.) 923. Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Assn., 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740 (1929).
Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905). See also
20 U. Cin. L Rev. 412-17, (My. 1951).
But since the advent of Liability insurance, the need for this protection has
vanished, since the trust-funds will not be diverted, judgment-claims being paid
by the insurance company. As to the inhibiting factor, it is slight, since the
prospective donor will more than likely consider the cost of insurance as a normal
cost of operation. Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 IML App. 618, 76 N. E. 2nd 342,
(1947).
(2) The inapplicability of Respondeat Superior in these situations. This
rule has been based upon the idea that the Agency situation (and its ensuing
liability) only arises when there has been some gain or benefit running to the
employer as a result of the employee's acts. The courts reasoned that because
there was no benefit to be gained by the charity hospital from a negligent tort
committed by the employee, this rendered Respondeat Superior inapplicable; ergo,
no liability. Southern Methodist Hosp. and Sanitorium of Tuscon v. Wilson,
45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2nd 118 (1935), and 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P. 2nd 458 (1938).
Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 A. 595 (1895). This actually is
a misconception of Agency law, (and was recognized as such in the Ray case,
supra). There need be no showing of a benefit running to the master before he
can be held vicariously liable in tort for his servants negligent, or even willful
acts. See 2 Mechem, Agency, sec. 1874 (2nd. Ed. 1914).
(3) The "Implied-Waiver" theory. That is, that when a beneficiary en-
tered a charitable establishment, there was an implied agreement on his part not
to sue for any subsequent negligence. Powers v. Homeoepathic Hosp., 109 Fed.
294, (1st Cir. 1901) certiorari denied, 183 U. S. 695 (1901). Wilcox v. Latter
Day Saints Hosp., 59 Ida. 350, 82 P. 2nd 849 (1938). This theory had advanced
so far that Cardozo, J., in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N. Y.
125, 105 N. E. 92 (1912), maintained that even a paying patient might have
waived his right to sue, in that, "the payment might be considered a contribution
to the charity." (This is no longer the New York law. Phillips v. Buffalo Gen-
eral Hosp., 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924) ).
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This theory has been successfully met with the contention that it is far too
much to expect a sick, legally-unlettered patient to realize that upon entering
this particular type of institution, he is voluntarily discarding an otherwise sub-
stantial right. See 19 Mich. L. Rev. 395-412, (1921).
(4) The New 'York theory. Vicarious liability in tort actions has been
attached inclusively to charity hospitals in New York, with one notable exception.
This one grant of immunity from the usual liability is extended to the employer
if the injuries complained of occur not through the negligence of a person work-
ing as a servant; Sheehan v. North County Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 163,
7 N. E. 2nd 28 (1937), (ambulance driver); Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hosp.
and Dispensary, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2nd 373 (1940), (hospital attendant);
or, as part of the administrative or clerical staff; Bakal v. University Heights Sani-
tarium, Inc. et al., 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N. Y. S. 2nd 385, (1st Dept. 1950), 26
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 366 (1951); but rather in a third category, which the courts
have termed "professional" 25 N. Y. U. L Rev. 612, 613 (1950). This class
has been narrowed to include doctors, and sometimes registered nurses. Bakal v.
University Heights Sanitarium, supra. By dint of his "professional" character, the
doctor, (or nurse), is not considered an employee, but rather an independent con-
tractor, and hence personally liable for the tort. Matter of Renouf v. New York
Central R.R. Co., 254 N. Y. 349, 173 N. E. 218 (1930). Schneider v. New York
Telephone Co., 249 App. Div. 400, 402, 292 N. Y. S. 399, 401 (1st Dept. 1938),
aff'd. 276 N. Y. 655, 13 N. E. 2nd 47 (1938). Respondeat Superior now being in-
applicable, the hospital is saved harmless from any vicarious liability, being treated
not as the employer, but as the mere procurer of the curative facilities. Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hosp., supra.
In similar situations, not involving charities, the very precise criteria used in
determining whether an actor is a servant, agent, or independent contractor
are strictly applied. See Restatement Agency, sec. 220, (1933). It is obvious
that these criteria, if correctly applied in the charity-tort situations, would, in
many instances, preclude any conclusion save that of the presence of the normal
agency relationship. Nevertheless, stare decisis is allowed to override the factual
demands, and in the eyes of the law, the "professional" employee continues to be
regarded as an independent contractor, with all the liabilities incident to that status.
For a criticism of this doctrine, see Prosser, Torts, 1079-81 (1941).
(5) That the dominant "Public policy" considerations are against recovery
in these situations. Fields v. Mountainside Hosp., 22 N. J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2nd
701 (1944). Southern Methodist Hosp. and Sanitorium of Tuscon v. Wilson,
supra. Since this elusive concept was not only a separate rationale for immunity
in itself, but also provided at least the psychological basis for the other four, it
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proved to be the greatest stumbling-block in the path of more inclusive liability.
See also, 22 A. B. A. J. 48, (1936).
Because of the ultimate harshrness of these rules against liability, the courts
soon began developing a varied array of exceptions. While being otherwise im-
mune, the charity employers have been held liable in these instances:
(a) if they were negligent in the selection of their employees. The Wilson
case, supra. Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., supra. (This was the Arizona rule
previous to the Ray case, and therefore, the plaintiff necessarily framed her com-
plaint under this sole exception.) Accord: Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83
S. E. 807 (1914). Contra: Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99
S. W. 453 (1907).
(b) if the plaintiff was not a beneficiary, but a paying patient. Tacker v.
Mobile Infirmary Assn., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915). Nicholson v. Good Sa-
maritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940). Sessions v. Thomas D. Leo
Memorial Hosp. Assn., 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2nd 645 (1938). Contra: under the
waiver theory, supra, the Schloendorff case, supra. St. Vincent's Hosp. v. Stine,
195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924).
(c) if plaintiff was not a patient, but rather a "stranger to the charity."
Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N. E. 737 (1930), (a nurse
not in defendant's employ.) Van Ingen v. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn, 227 N. Y.
665, 126 N. E. 524 (1924), (a passenger in a private car-hit by defendant's
ambulance).
(d) if defendant charity permits employee to perform medical duties, when
he has no competency in the matter. White v. Prospect Heights Hosp., 278 App.
Div. 789, 103 N. Y. S. 2nd 859 (2nd Dept. 1951).
(e) if plaintiff is an invitee. Alabama Baptist Hosp. Board v. Carter, 226
Ala. 109, 145 So. 443 (1933). Cohen v. General Hosp. Soc. of Conn., 113 Conn.
188, 154 A. 435 (1931). McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 170 Tenn. 423, 95
S. W. 2nd 917 (1936). Hosp. of St. Vincent in City of Norfolk v. Thompson.
116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914).
(f) if plaintiff is an employee of the charity. Cowans v. North Carolina
Baptist Hosp., 197 N. C. 47, 147 S. E. 672 (1929). See also, Prosser, Torts 1079-
1085 supra.
Although the doctrine of Charities' Tort Immunity has met with steadily
increasing criticism both in the courts, and the authorities (3 Scott, Trusts, 2418-
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50 (1939); Harper, Torts, 294 (1933), only two other jurisdictions have also
cast aside the bonds of stare decisis, and have declared the policy overruled,
charities henceforth being fully liable for the torts of their employees, like any
other corporation. Porto Rico Gas and Coke Co. v. Frank Rullan and Assoc.,
Rullen v. U. S., U. S. v. Foard et al, (3 cases), 189 F. 2nd 397 (1st Cir. 1951).
Malloy v. F ng, 37 A. C. 356, 232 P. 2nd 241 (1951). See also, Cal. Code Civ.
Proc., sec. 1714; Puerto Rico Civil Code, sec. 1802-3; 39 Cal. L Rev. 455 (1951).
It is submitted that the principal case not only takes proper cognizance of
the changing social and economic conditions, and thus better enables the law to
keep "abreast of the times,' but also that the Ray case may well be a foretelling
of a nation wide overthrow of the Charities' Tort Immunity Doctrine.
Robert Alan Thompson
CONTRACTS-AGREEMENTS NOT TO COMPETE-POWERS OF EQUITY
TO SCALE DOWN UNREASONABLE TERMS
Defendant sold his bakery located in Boston, Mass. to plaintiff. Defendant
agreed in the bill of sale that he would "not engage in the bakery business directly
or indirectly for a period of seven years within a radius of seven miles of Boston."
The following year defendant entered the employ of another baker in the city at a
weekly salary. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from engaging in the bakery
business according to the terms of the bill of sale. The lower court found the
limitations of seven years and seven miles unreasonable. The judge found it
reasonable however, to restrain defendant from engaging in the bakery business
"directly or indirectly" within a radius of four miles from plaintiff's bakery, and for
a period of four years. The court then held that defendant had violated the new
"reasonable" restrictions, and issued an order restraining defendant from continuing
in such business. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
Thomas et al v. Paker - Mass -, 98 N. E. 640 (1951).
Early English and American decisions evince a strong tendency to strike down
covenants not to compete. Mitchell v. Reynolds 1 Pere Williams 181 (1711).
Noble v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307 (N. Y. 1827). For history of restrictive convenants
see Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel, 227 Fed. 588, at 592 (6th circuit 1915).
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber 106 N. Y. 463, 13 N. E. 419, (1887). Also see
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 513, (1932), 5 Williston, Contracts sec. 1633, 1636,
(Revised Edition, 1937). 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec. 1379 (First Edition 1951).
However, modern authority upholds such covenants when two requirements are
satisfied. The covenant must be (1) ancillary or subordinate to the main purpose
of the contract and (2) reasonably necessary for the protection of the business and
goodwill. See Justice Taft's noted dictum in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. U. S.
